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The empirical testing of the median voter hypothesis broadly defined has 
undergone a revival. In addition to the papers that do the usual cross-country testing of 
the median voter hypothesis and often find a rather weak support for it (Dalgaard, Hansen 
and Larsen 2005, Kenworthy and McCall 2008, Lind 2005, Moene and Wallerstein 2006, 
Nel 2007, Creedy and Moslehi 2009), a number of other papers redefine, perhaps 
precisely because of the weak empirical support for the straightforward application of the 
hypothesis, either the "identity" of the median voter or the domain of the voters.  Dhami 
and el-Nowaihi (2007) redefine the voter so that he or she is concerned with "fairness" of 
the distribution and not only with individual well-being. Shayo (2009) introduces 
"individual national identification", which he argues, based on World Values Survey 
data, to be stronger among the poor voters, and which reduces their propensity to vote for 
redistribution. To paraphrase Marx, "national identification" here acts as "the opiate of 
the people." In Hodler (2008), voters, in addition to income, care about leisure; societies 
with greater preference for leisure also select more redistributive policies. Berenboim and 
Karabarbounis (2008) propose a "one dollar, one vote" hypothesis whereby the 
economically stronger the group (poor, middle class, or rich), the more able it is to 
impose its redistribution preferences. Here, income matters but, up to a certain point, in a 
different way from the original hypothesis. While in the medium-voter hypothesis it is the 
numbers of the poor vs. rich that matter, here is it their aggregate economic power. 
Tanninen and Tuomala (2001) and Scervini (2009) focus on a more exact definition of 
who the median voter is, arguing that he or she needs to be placed within the "inherent" 
or market income distribution (not as is more commonly done within the disposable 
income distribution). Mahler (2006), Chong and Olivera (2008), and Arawatari (2009) 
redefine the population of voters by endogenizing electoral turnout, that is by showing 
that inequality itself may influence who votes (e.g., electoral turnout of the poor), which 
would then, in turn, influence the extent  of redistribution that a society selects. Campante 
and Do (2008) find that greater population density, through the implicit threat that many 
poor people in close proximity pose to rulers, is conducive to greater redistribution. 
Finally, there are papers that look at the theory alone, and review the reasons why the 3 
 
process we observe seems to produce different outcomes from that which a simple model 
posits (Harns and Zink, 2003; Tridimas and Winer, 2005).  
 
The pervasive use of micro data on income, mostly from the Luxembourg Income 
Study, and the emphasis on market (or "inherent") income distribution, can be traced to 
the methodology introduced in my paper published as the World Bank Working Paper 
No. 2246 in December 1999 (“Do more unequal countries redistribute more? Does the 
median voter hypothesis hold?”), later published in the European Journal of Political 
Economy (Milanovic, 2000) and which for the first time used household level data 
derived from household income surveys to test the hypothesis, and in the process 
reformulated the hypothesis itself. I proposed that the correct data to test the hypothesis 
had not been previously used. I tested the median-voter hypothesis by calculating the gain 
realized by different deciles of income distribution when people are ranked by their pre-
redistribution (market) income. This was in the spirit of the hypothesis as originally 
formulated by Meltzer and Richard (1981): based on their pre- redistribution income, 
people vote for the level of taxes and type of government expenditures. Previously, 
however, the test was done in such a way that people appeared to vote on tax-and-transfer 
combinations based on their ranks in post-distribution income or the distribution of 
disposable income, which of course is logically wrong, since disposable income is the 
outcome of the redistributive process.
1 The reason for this approach, so obviously wrong 
at the slightest reflection, was probably because the authors were unfamiliar with 
household surveys and may not have realized that a given (say, bottom)  pre- and post-
redistribution  income deciles may be composed of  very different people. Moreover, the 
authors might not have been aware that micro data on pre-redistribution income deciles, 
or more generally fractiles, even if not widely available, do exist. 
  
While the approach that I used is obvious, the interpretation of the sharegain (the 
difference in the share of a given decile in post- and pre-redistribution income) to directly 
measure redistribution has been questioned. Four types of criticisms have been leveled at 
                                                 
1 Market income minus direct taxes plus government cash transfers equals disposable income. 4 
 
my approach and interpretation of the results. My objective here is to set out the critiques, 
discuss them, and assess their validity. 
 
By way of introduction, I should clearly explain how my analysis was done. For 
each country and year (using household-level data from surveys available through the 
Luxembourg Income Study, LIS), individuals were ranked by their (household per capita) 
market income, from the poorest to the richest, and grouped in deciles. Market income is 
the sum of wages, property incomes, self-employment income and imputed own 
consumption. In addition, I defined marketP income (called factor P  income in my 2000 
paper), which is equal to market income plus state-funded pensions. The reason why 
state-funded pensions are included as part of market income is that they can be regarded 
as deferred wage payments through a contractual obligation incurred by the state to its 
wage-tax payers. Market (or marketP) income can also be called pre-redistribution 




To assess redistribution directly, I then observed how the share of each market 
income decile (that is, the same people) changes in the move from market to gross to 
disposable income. For simplicity, we can skip gross income, which is equal to market 
income plus government transfers. Consider the share of the people in the poorest decile 
(according to market income) in market and disposable income. If a tax-and-transfer 
system is in their favor, they  have a larger share of disposable than  market income. The 
difference between the two shares is called sharegain. The empirical results showed that 
the sharegain was larger for the (market income) poor deciles and then declined before 
becoming negative for the rich. In other words, the beneficiaries of the redistribution 
process were the market-income poor. The results also showed that as the market income 
share of any decile goes down, its sharegain becomes larger. For the rich, this means that 
if market income distribution becomes more equal, their sharegain will be less negative. 
                                                 
2 Government cash transfers include unemployment benefits, child benefits, social assistance, and alimony 
payments. 5 
 
For the poor, it means that greater redistribution (greater sharegain of the poor) will tend 
to compensate for higher market income inequality. 
 
The last point is of crucial importance. It implies that a more market unequal state 
of affairs in a country will tend to lead to a more generous redistribution in favor to the 
poor. It is here that it becomes important to distinguish between (what may be called) the 
redistribution hypothesis and the median voter hypothesis. The latter can be, as is 
conventional, defined by saying that the median voter is a decisive voter, and hence that 
his or her position vis-à-vis the rest of the distribution (e.g., vis-à-vis the mean or the top 
of income distribution) will determine the voting outcome in such a way that a lower 
relative position of the median voter will result in greater redistribution. The advantage of 
the median voter hypothesis is that it is firmly based in theory. The disadvantage is that it 
cannot be tested with sufficient precision. Even the way that Meltzer and Richard (1983) 
originally tested it using the median-to-mean gross earnings ratio was unfortunate for at 
least two reasons: (a) voters are a much broader category than wage-earners, (b) people 
vote depending on how they believe their family income will be affected. Regarding 
point (a), is it reasonable to assume that a person with a very high capital income and no 
wages would vote for high taxes? Regarding point (b), is it reasonable to assume that two 
spouses, one with high and another with low earnings, would vote differently from one 
other and not as a couple? Should we expect that families composed of a high-earning 
spouse and a non-working spouse would split their vote?  It is clearly not reasonable – in 
either case. 
 
The second problem encountered in empirical specifications of the median voter 
hypothesis is even more serious: (c) who exactly is the median voter, and (d) against 
whose income does the median voter compare own income? As for (c), Bassett, Burkett 
and Putterman (1999), for example, redefine the median to be a “pivotal” voter, that is, 
the one who is median among the voting population, and since the poor tend to vote less, 
the pivotal voter is to the right of the median (by income). This is similar to the approach 
that endogenizes voter turnout discussed above.  On (d), the common practice, begun by 
Meltzer and Richard (1983), was to use the median-to-mean ratio (see also Perotti, 1996). 6 
 
However, Moene and Wallerstein (2001, 2003) have used the 90-10 ratio (income at the 
90
th percentile vs. income at the 10
th percentile), and Iversen and Soskice (2006) have 
used the 90-to-median ratio. The exact measure chosen has varied from author to author, 
seemingly depending on author’s preferences, availability of the data (OECD provides 
the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 gross wage ratios), or perhaps contingent on the formulation 
that yielded the desired result.  Barenboim and Karabarbounis (2008) used three 
measures: gross earnings at the 90
th percentile, 10
th percentile and at the median, each 
normalized by the mean.  It is hard to see which one of these numerous ways to define 
the median voter and to compare his or her income with income of somebody else makes 
more or less sense. This has lead to a fundamental problem of an insufficiently 
empirically circumscribed hypothesis, and to “groping” for that particular position in 
income distribution that the “decisive” voter might occupy as well as with whom exactly 
he or she might compare own income.  
 
2. The redistribution hypothesis defined 
 
There is a way, which I used in my 2000 paper to reformulate the hypothesis in 
order to avoid the arbitrariness implicit in the search for the elusive “median” or 
“decisive” voter. My 2000 paper formulated two hypotheses that I propose to call jointly 
the “redistribution hypothesis”:   
 
(i)  More market-income unequal situations are associated with greater 
redistribution, and,  
(ii)  An increase in the market income share of a given decile is associated 
with a lower sharegain for that decile.   
 
The first part of the hypothesis is easily and clearly tested by looking at, on the 
one hand, an inequality index (say, Gini) of market income and, on the other hand, the 
decrease in that index as we move from market to disposable income. We expect to find a 
positive relationship: the higher the initial (market) Gini, the greater its subsequent 
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where Gmk and Gdk are Ginis for market (m) and disposable (d) income inequality in 
country k, and Ψ indicates country-level control variables including country dummies, 
and εk= normally-distributed error term. We expect α1>0 (note that the dependent 
variable is defined as reduction). 
 
The second part of the hypothesis is tested by regressing the sharegain against 
market income share for each decile, that is.  
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where Sm,ik is the share of i-th decile in market (pre-redistribution) income in country k, 
Sd,ik is the share of the same people in disposable income, and uik is the error term. 
3  The 
difference Sdi-Smi is the sharegain. The key expected result is that the coefficient βi should 
be negative for all deciles, that if for all i  (1,10).  It means that if a given decile is better 
off pre-redistribution, it will gain less through redistribution.
4  Of course, we may be 
particularly interested in what happens to the poorest deciles, but the negative 
relationship ought to hold for all deciles. 
   
Both (1) and (2) are readily testable and are broader hypotheses than the median 
voter hypothesis. (1) and (2) jointly ask whether greater redistribution is likely to happen 
in more market-unequal environments, but they do not address the exact mechanism 
                                                 
3 Note that the people who are in the poorest decile according to pre-redistribution income need not be, and 
generally will not be, in the poorest decile according to disposable (post-redistribution) income. In effect, 
many of them are likely to climb much higher. However, we are not interested in comparing the poorest 
decile according to pre-redistribution income to the poorest decile according to post-redistribution income 
because this is not the object of  the hypothesis. We are interested in finding out how  much, on average, 
the people in the poorest pre-redistribution decile gain through government redistribution process. 
 
4 My 2000 paper also showed that the coefficient  β1 for the bottom decile and quintile is not significantly 
different from unity. This can be interpreted as indicating that if market income distribution “moves” 
against the poorest decile, the redistributive system will exactly compensate for that shortfall. Scervini 
(2010) has argued that with the more recent LIS data this result no longer holds and that rich countries have 
become less redistributive.  8 
 
whereby this happens. The median voter hypothesis may provide one such mechanism. 
However, decisively establishing that it is the mechanism crucially depends on our ability 
to credibly decide who is the median, or rather the decisive, voter.  I propose to term this 
broader hypothesis, the redistribution hypothesis because we need to distinguish the 
hypothesis proper it from one specific mechanism (the median voter) whereby it may be 
implemented.  
 
  We test the two parts of the redistribution hypothesis using the most recent data 
from Luxembourg Income Study for 20 OECD countries covering the period 1967-2005 
(total number of country/years is 110).  We deal here with an (unbalanced) panel, which, 
especially in terms of econometric issues raised, differs from either static- or time-series 
analysis as conducted by Meltzer and Richard (1983).
5 Table 1 shows the results of a 
very simple testing of the first part of the redistribution hypothesis. Column (1) shows the 
simplest possible test where the only control is unobservable country fixed effect. 
Column (2) introduces two additional country controls. Obviously, further controls could 
be brought in but my contention is that α1 would remain positive and statistically 
significant.
6  Indeed, we see that its value is stable: a one point increase in marketP Gini 
is associated with between 0.438 and 0.473 Gini points greater reduction brought about 
by the process of redistribution. In other words, a more market-unequal state of affairs is 
associated with greater reduction in inequality as government taxes and transfers cash 
incomes.  
                                                 
5 I am grateful for this point to an anonymous referee.  
6 One obvious additional control is democracy but in this sample of established democracies its between-
country variability is very small, and in most cases, for a single country it is also time-invariant and thus 
cannot be included in a country fixed effect regression.  9 
 
 
Table 1. Simple regressions of relation (1) 
Dependent variable: Gini reduction through the redistribution process 
(Gini of marketP income minus Gini of disposable income) 
 
 (1)  (2) 





Openness   +0.002 
(0.9) 
 









2 (within) 0.47  0.54 
F value  78.7  30.7 
Number of observations  110  100 
Note: Regressions are run as country fixed effects. Openness is defined as (exports+imports) over GDP. .  
t-values between parentheses. ** = significant at less than 1% level. 
 
.  
Let us move to the second part of the redistribution hypothesis. Using the data 
from the same source,  figure 1 shows a simple two-way relationship between the 
sharegain and marketP income share for the two bottom and the two top deciles. For the 
bottom decile, the regression coefficient β1 is -0.91 (with t-value of over 6). The 
interpretation is that if marketP income share of the bottom decile increases by one 
percentage point, its sharegain will be reduced by 0.91 percentage points.  For the second 
poorest decile, β2  is -0.78 (also highly significant). For the top decile, β10 coefficient 
amounts to -0.29 (t-value of over 7) and for the second highest (ninth) decile, β9 is -0.69 
(t=9.4). The situation is analogous with the other deciles. Thus, equation (2) performs as 
expected.  10 
 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between sharegain and initial marketP income share 
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Note: Decile share in marketP income on the horizontal axis. Sharegain (on the vertical axis) is the 
difference in a given marketP decile share in disposable and marketP income (expressed in percentage 
points). 95 percent confidence interval shaded.  11 
 
After this sketch of my 2000 approach, and its short update, I now move to the 
critiques. They fall into four categories. 
 
  3. The four critiques 
 
3.1 Country effects 
 
The first critique is the easiest to deal with because it is based on a 
misunderstanding of the methodology used in my paper. The regressions were run with 
country fixed effects (not as pooled cross-sections), and the identification therefore does 
not come from inter-country differences. In other words, the results do not allow us to 
conclude, for example, what accounts for greater redistribution in Sweden than in the 
United States, or in European countries in general than in the United States (see Alesina 
and Angeletos, 2005). They allow us simply to state that if market income inequality in 
either Sweden or the US increases, redistribution will go up and the sharegain of the 
poorest decile will increase. But the level of the sharegain in both countries may still be 
vastly different. And indeed, if we look at Sweden and the US, it is (see Figure 2). 12 
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Note: Sharegain defined as the difference in the share of  the bottom decile (based on marketP income) in 
disposable and marketP income. 
 
 
Hence the critique, as for example in Dhami and el-Nowaihi (2007, p.9), that 
because  (i) both Sweden and the US have about the same market inequality, 
7  while (ii) 
the extent of redistribution is different,  the model must be faulty, is based on a 
misunderstanding of the way the empirical analysis was conducted. The level of  
redistribution  in both Sweden and the United States (or any other country) may be 
explained  by other “deep” variables like history of social policy, culture, ethnic 
homogeneity,  trust, prospects of upward mobility, aggregation of political preferences 
(organization of the political system) etc. The model accepts all of this, and accounts for 
the unobservable effects through its use of the country dummies; its argument is simple: 
                                                 
7 This is not exactly true but the difference is small. For example, in 2005 or 2004, Gini for US market 
income is 50, for Sweden 46. The difference is larger in the case of marketP income. 13 
 
greater market inequality in any county will (controlled for all other observable and 
unobservable factors) lead to greater redistribution. 
 
3.2 Incentives or endogeneity 
 
The second type of critique is more sophisticated. In several seminar 
presentations, as well as in some writing (see Berenboim and Karabarbounis, 2008, pp. 
10, 13), I have been faced with the argument that the measured effect is not “net” in the 
sense that the more redistributive states of affairs (I use this term deliberately to avoid 
comparing countries) will show an “unwarrantedly” high measured redistribution because 
they affect people’s incentives. Thus, if unemployment benefits exist and are generous, 
people will more easily accept to be unemployed, will consequently have very low or 
zero market incomes, and the sharegain (thanks to the existence of  generous 
unemployment benefits) will be large. Were unemployment benefits less generous, 
people will not go so easily into the unemployed status, they would not be so market-
income poor, and the sharegain would be less. This is not a new problem. Introduction of 
any government intervention (minimum wage, schooling fee, water user charge) leads to 
the same incentives issues which have been extensively debated in the literature (for a 
review of US evidence, see Moffitt 1992, and more recently Moffitt, 2002). 
 
Here, the argument is that, due to endogeneity, we are likely to overestimate 
sharegain and thus redistribution in more generous welfare regimes. Taken literally, this 
critique is correct and seemingly irrefutable. However, the critique has two weak points. 
 
First, by focusing on the incentive effects of some transfers (like unemployment 
benefits), it fails to realize that the same argument can be made for any other social 
transfer. Sharegain from child benefits is not exogenous either. Depending on the 
generosity of child benefits, people may have more or fewer children (there is a long 
history of pro-natalist policies in many countries) and this will also affect the sharegain. 
Families with many children will be, using pre-redistribution household per capita 
income to rank them, classified in low deciles. Since they are the recipients of child 14 
 
benefits, the sharegain for these low deciles will be large. Again, we may conclude that 
the system is inherently generous while a lot of its measured generosity is driven by the 
change in people’s behavior. Similarly, depending on the education policy followed in 
the past, the rate of  unemployment now may be higher or lower, and the number of  
people with low or zero market incomes may vary, and again sharegain will vary 
reflecting nothing else but  past education policies.  Other features of human life, such as 
mating may be affected by the welfare system; for example, whether inheritance is 
heavily taxed, whether women have the same opportunity as men to go to school.  
 
In all these cases, more generous welfare systems appear as “victims of their own 
success”: by pushing people to adopt behaviors that are more rewarding, the 
redistributive character of the regimes is exacerbated since both market inequality and the 
measured redistribution are biased upward, compared to a hypothetical state of the world 
where such benefits do not elicit the change in the behavior of potential recipients. 
 
The critique, while fundamentally correct, to some extent misses the point 
because the presence of any benefit can be shown (as we have just argued) to lead to 
behavior changes and thus to create endogeneity.  We would therefore need somehow to 
assess the redistributive character of the system while not allowing for behavioral 
changes induced by the system. This is of course extremely difficult because the benefits 
thus covered must not include only unemployment compensations  whose impact is rather 
immediate, but also the benefits whose impact is felt only in the long run, such as child 
allowances or education spending.  Like the welfare system itself, this critique is also a 
victim of its own success. Taken literally, it would make any analysis of redistributive 
effect of various welfare regimes virtually impossible.  
 
To address this problem by the common use of instrumental variables does not 
seem adequate.  The reason is that the problem is "produced" by a background variable, 
which we may call "tax and benefit system set up or generosity" that affects people's 
incentives, and incentives in turn affect both independent (market inequality, Gmk  in 
equation 1) and dependent (redistribution, Gmk-Gdk) variables. This would seem to argue 15 
 
for the introduction of "system generosity" as another right-hand side variable in 
equations such as (1). "System generosity" is not strictly speaking a non-observable 
variable. But to include it in a regression, we need to measure it. And to measure it, as we 
have argued and will again see below, is very difficult, and it is particularly difficult since 
such a variable would have to measure generosity of a number of government 
interventions--not only unemployment benefits, but also education, policy toward 
children allowances, even minimum wage and practically all other government 
interventions. "System generosity" (assuming that we somehow measure it, or perhaps 
create several such variables for different government transfers) will strongly covary with 
market inequality: more generous systems will stimulate behavior that results in greater 
market inequality. This will both bias t-values down and, more importantly, make 
difficult the interpretation of the results, that is, telling apart the effect of market 
inequality from that of "system generosity". When "generosity" of the system is zero 
(government neither taxes its citizens, nor pays any benefits), we cannot retrieve the 
"natural" relation between market inequality and redistribution, because redistribution in 
question here is government redistribution. With "generosity" of zero, redistribution 
must, by definition, be zero too. All of these points illustrate the difficulty of an 
"econometric" solution to the problem.  
 
The second argument against this critique is based on the fact that the existing 
welfare systems do not emerge spontaneously or randomly. They are brought about as a 
result of political developments within a nation, and hence if at some point in time a 
sufficient majority votes in favor of an extension of unemployment benefits or in favor of 
high child allowances, it must have been willed by that majority. Thus the very fact that 
the benefits exist in one state of the world and not in another tells us that there is a 
political constituency in their favor. When voting on them, the voters have to take into 
account that benefits’ very existence may lead to the change in people’s behavior and 
must therefore vote for both (i) benefits’ formal eligibility rules and (ii) the change in 
behavior that they will entail. When we then observe a given extent of redistribution, we 
can argue that this is the extent of redistribution that the voters wished to enact. In other 
words, high generosity of the system is not an unplanned event but precisely what the 16 
 
electoral constituency (or the median voter, if that’s the right mechanism) wanted to bring 
about. Measured redistribution therefore yields insights into peoples’ preferences. 
 
3.3 Automatic stabilizers 
 
The third critique is in some ways a follow-up of the second. Here the argument is 
that the observed increase in redistribution (an  increase in the sharegain of the poorest) 
will tend to be interpreted as an indication that  the welfare system has become more 
generous whereas, in reality, the economy may be simply going through a recession that 
raises the number of the unemployed, pushes many families into the lowest deciles 
(measured by market income), and  results in an increase in redistribution (see 
Kenworthy and McCall, 2008, p. 41).  In other words, the generosity of the welfare 
system is still the same but the number of claimants becomes larger as does the observed 
sharegain. 
 
This is a valid critique and probably the one most difficult to disregard. However 
we can address it by being careful in our interpretation of the results. If we observe that 
the sharegain has increased and find no obvious change in social legislation, then we 
have to look at whether this may be due to the business cycle effects. We should 
introduce controls for the business cycle (e.g. rate of unemployment) in the regressions 
such as (1) and (2).  
 
Kenworthy and McCall (2008) also argue that the public, in making its decisions 
on which tax-and-transfer system it prefers, focuses on legal or “intended” generosity of 
the system.  To  find out whether the public prefers a more generous system one needs to 
focus—they write—on its legal rules, not on the observed amount of redistribution. This 
is why, in their analysis of eight advanced economies, they use scores of “intended 
generosity” (developed by Scruggs, 2004) of the pension system, unemployment benefits, 
child benefits and social assistance.  
 17 
 
However, to give preference to formal transfer rules rather than to measured 
redistribution is not quite such an obvious choice. (This, in addition to the problem, 
acknowledged by Kenworthy and McCall, that there are difficulties of assigning 
subjective “generosity” scores to translate legal rules into values that can be used in an 
empirical investigation.)  First, the very fact that the system is more redistributive (even if 
its legal basis has not become more generous) is important for policy-makers as it is for 
the public. The fact will certainly attract people’s attention, and the views about 
desirability or not of such a system will be based on its actual redistributive properties—
in the last analysis, on the observation of how much the system costs and who benefits 
from it. Second, as in the previous endogeneity critique, it is important to realize that the 
political coalition that brought about such a system of redistribution must have taken into 
account that, in cases of business cycles, it might lead to large redistributions. This, in 
turn, means that there was a sufficient political consensus to enact such (potentially) 
generous redistributive schemes, which is precisely the point about which the 
redistribution or the median voter hypothesis is concerned. For both reasons, therefore, 
when we assess a welfare system, we may prefer to look at actual redistribution rather 
than at formal legal rules only.  
 
3.4 Mechanical correlation 
 
The last critique holds that the results are “mechanical”. This is because very 
market-equal  regimes, regardless of  the tax rate they choose, will not be able to effect  
much of a redistribution simply because their starting point is already very egalitarian 
(see Lind, 2005). To see the gist of this critique, assume that the tax rate is randomly 
chosen, that is, does not depend on market income inequality. Lind aims to show that 
despite this assumption, which would seem to invalidate the redistribution hypothesis, we 
shall be likely to accept the hypothesis that more market unequal states of the world 
display greater measured redistribution. To see this, imagine a situation where market 
income is almost equally distributed across the deciles (there may be just infinitesimal 
differences between the deciles’ average incomes to allow us to rank them). Whether the 
tax rate chosen by the voters is very high or very low, does not really matter for 18 
 
redistribution since everybody will pay more or less the same in taxes, and—an unstated 
assumption by Lind—receive the same amount in the form of transfers. The welfare 
system would have simply churned money around and the market poor will end up with 
about the same share of disposable income as they started, rendering the sharegain close 
to nil. Thus, “mechanically”, market-income equal states of the world will always tend to 
register low redistribution regardless of the tax rate chosen. As for more market-unequal 
states of the world, their tax rate is also randomly taken to be either high or low, but 
measured redistribution will always be positive. When we put these two states of the 
world (equal and unequal) together in an empirical analysis, we shall detect a positive 
relationship between pre-redistribution inequality and redistribution. Egalitarian market-
income states of the world will always have zero or close to zero redistribution, unequal 
states of the world, on average, positive redistribution. Thus although the tax rate is by 
assumption randomly distributed, we shall be nevertheless led—mistakenly, Lind 
argues—to accept the redistribution hypothesis. 
 
Lind’s critique is wrong because he identifies redistribution with the tax rate only. 
8 When we investigate the redistribution hypothesis, we are interested in the overall effect 
of both tax and transfer policies, that is in actual redistribution, and not merely in one side 
of that equation, taxes only.
9  To see this, suppose that, regardless of pre-redistribution 
inequality, the welfare system is so finely calibrated that each income class pays in taxes 
exactly what it receives in social transfers. Redistribution is zero and such a system is, 
regardless of the level of tax rate, non-redistributive. Lind believes that because the link 
between high tax rate and redistribution does not necessarily hold, my approach must be 
flawed.  But to be redistributive, it is not sufficient that a regime have a high tax rate; it 
must also transfer income to the poor. To go back to his example of market-equal states 
of the world that are invariably shown to be non-redistributive, this need not be true if the 
transfers are directed to the poor. Thus market-equal states of the world may be either 
redistributive or not, once we take into account the effect of both taxes and transfers. 
Whether they are one or the other is not merely a data artifact.   
                                                 
8 Borge and Rattso (2004)  also explicitly, and in my opinion, wrongly, do so.    
9 This is what Lind does when in Figure 3 he generates a “mechanical” relationship between redistribution 
and market income inequality.   19 
 
 
In conclusion, when we observe low sharegain for low market-unequal countries, 
it is not a “mechanical” relation, but a very real one. It shows that in such cases, even the 
poor, gain, at the end of the game, very little from the tax-and-transfer system. 
 
 4.  Conclusions 
 
I have rephrased and redefined more correctly the redistribution 
hypothesiscontained in my 2000 article and have clarified its relationship with the median 
voter hypothesis. I have also reviewed four types of critiques leveled at my approach. The 
first is based on a misunderstanding of the regressions run in the paper.  The fourth is 
based on a wrong identification of redistribution with the tax rate alone.  The second and 
third critiques are more valid. The endogeneity critique is fundamentally correct but its 
consistent application would make practically impossible any judgment or measurement 
of the redistributive impact of different welfare systems. This is because the upward bias 
to the measured impact, which is caused by  people’s change in behavior, is often 
difficult or entirely impossible to quantify, particularly so in the case of long-run effects 
such as those of  family formation and education. An econometric solution to the problem 
is unlikely because of the difficulty of measuring a variable such as "system generosity" 
and disentangling its effect from that of market inequality. The third critique (business 
cycle) is probably the strongest. It highlights the fact that even if (i) the underlying 
structure of the welfare system is unchanged, and (ii) the behavioral parameters of people 
unchanged as well, yet there could be a measured change in the sharegain due to the 
changed external environment (e.g., increased rate of unemployment). This imposes on 
researchers a duty, when they compare different states of the world, to look at business 
cycle variables (and to control for them, if they can). It does not invalidate the 
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